Loyola Consumer Law Review
Volume 30
Issue 2 Antitrust Marathon VI: Compliance
Matters

Article 5

2018

Transcript: Incentives to Comply with Competition Law
Max Huffman

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Max Huffman Transcript: Incentives to Comply with Competition Law, 30 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 121
(2018).
Available at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr/vol30/iss2/5

This Feature Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Loyola Consumer Law Review by an authorized editor of LAW eCommons. For more information,
please contact law-library@luc.edu.

8.First Panel.docx (Do Not Delete)

5/4/18 7:16 PM

TRANSCRIPT: INCENTIVES TO COMPLY WITH
COMPETITION LAW
Panel Speaker: Max Huffman*
Philip Marsden1
Good morning everybody, thank you for coming. My name
is Philip Marsden, I’m a Deputy Chair of the Competition Markets
Authority in the United Kingdom, a very big welcome to everybody here, thanks so much to the Competition Authority for hosting us and for helping us prepare this event on a topic of compliance, which is of such importance not only to healthy markets and
to companies, but also to authorities, because they are great efficiencies in getting the incentives right on this topic. This event
couldn’t have come together without the hard work of Spencer
Waller and his team at Loyola, our speakers today, Tihamér Tóth
and the University for bringing us all together in such a nice fashion and to have this kind of interaction amongst officials and lawyers and in-house counsel and academics. This is our sixth antitrust marathon that Spencer and I have been involved with and I
see other marathon runners around the room, Max Huffman, Ted
Janger and others you’ll meet as we go through. I just want to
make sure you understand that by joining us today, you are indeed
all required to run the Budapest Marathon on Sunday [laughter],
so thank you so much [laughter]. If you get tired maybe you could
just stand at the side of the road and give Max and Ted and Spencer and I a drink as we go along but it’s wonderful to be here in
this beautiful city and to be talking about these topics. Previous
* Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School
of Law.
1
Deputy Chair, Competition and Markets Authority, London; Professor, College of Europe, Bruges.
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antitrust marathons have been held at the Competition Appeal
Tribunal in London, at Loyola in Chicago, at the British High
Commission in Boston, at the Italian Competition Authority in
Rome, and at the Dublin Writer’s Museum in coordination with
the Irish Competition Authority. So, what we really try to aim for
in these discussions is an understanding of long-enduring competition problems that may take at least a day to discuss, and we’ll
have some aid stations and some rest-breaks and some re-fueling,
but really that’s the idea of this marathon series, these are always
topics, whether it’s abuse of dominance or today, compliance,
which are long living, they’ll never go away. We’re always learning and always trying to get better and more efficient, but they’re
topics that have a life of their own. Further, the interaction
amongst academics, officials, and the lawyers in the room is something that only helps us have a better understanding of how this
works. We’re so very honored to have so many senior officials with
us, and indeed the President of the Authority here today, and we
are really grateful to you for being here today and for being able to
offer us a few initial remarks. Thank you.
Miklós Juhász2
Thank you very much ladies and gentlemen. The speakers
from across the Atlantic, from Europe, I would like to welcome you
on behalf of the Hungarian Competition Authority. We are delighted to hold the Sixth Antitrust Marathon on compliance at the
GVH. As you know, people of the same trade seldom meet together
even for merriment or diversion. You might have recognized the
words of the famous Scotsman, Adam Smith, would have been
grateful to hear that today’s lively discussions will not result in
conspiracies against the public, but in favor of promoting competitive mechanisms.
Our agency is very much devoted to promoting compliance
with competition rules. Promoting competition culture is a key element in prevention, the GVH actively participated at the fifth
ICC roundtable on Competition Policy in Warsaw and we are also
big supporters of the ICC Antitrust Compliance Toolkit.
2

President, Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH).
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As of an agency perspective, since 2012 the GVH launched
a unique online and offline competition law compliance campaign.
Our authority set up a homepage, we established cooperative relationships with professional organizations such as lawyers, accountants, and business interest groups whose daily works closely link
to the work of SMEs3. Our media campaigns targeted mainly these
companies, as according to our statistics, more than 70% of our
cartel investigations were conducted against small and medium
enterprises. These companies are the backbone of our economy,
but compared to large firms, they have a lower level of competition
awareness and fewer resources. Ex post surveys strengthened
hopes that our campaign in fact reached company directors and
improved their knowledge on competition rules and on the GVH.
I’m convinced that this event will further contribute to the better
understanding of competition compliance. I look forward to a
fruitful discussion, especially on the very demanding second topic
on the trade associations and information exchange. Enjoy your
stay in Hungary, thank you very much.
Spencer Waller4
Good morning everybody, my name is Spencer Waller and
I’m a professor at Loyola University Chicago School of Law and
the Director of our Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies. I am
thrilled to have everyone here today. I want to echo Philip’s thanks
to all of our hosts and all of our speakers and everyone who took
time out of their busy day to join us for the antitrust portion of the
marathon. I assure you, no running is involved, unless you want
to. My job is to discuss the rules of the road, I guess that makes me
the course director. Our marathon, as it has evolved over the six
times that Philip has talked about, has settled into a comfortable
pace.
What we do is have a conversation. This is truly a round
table. It is truly a discussion. It is not papers and an audience, either we are all audience, or we are all speakers, however you want
3

Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs).
Professor, and Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies,
Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
4
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to think about it. For this to work, we all come together in our individual capacities. I understand, obviously, that everyone works
somewhere and represents some interests, public and/or private,
and that’s fine. But today we come as individuals and do our best
to shed that affiliation to offer our expertise in conversation about
these important issues.
It’s my pleasure also to introduce, and you’ll hear from
them a little later, Ben Mayers and Abra Slivinski, they are the
editors of the Loyola Consumer Law Review and after lunch they
will tell you a little bit about the publication process. We will be
publishing, as we have, alternating between the European Competition Review and the Loyola Consumer Law Review and in that
part of the race we will be tied three to three after the publication.
The short papers that you have to get the discussion rolling will be
published and then an edited version of the transcript will be published so that no one will be published without their explicit consent and approval of the words that they choose.
We are assuming that you have read or at least glanced at
the issues papers and as a result we just ask the speakers to give
ten minutes of a summary to remind us of the thoughts that kick
off each of the four sessions. The first session has two speakers for
ten minutes each because we are delighted to have the Chairman
of the Hungarian Competition Commission, Dr. Andras Tóth,
with us as well as Max Huffman from the University of Indiana.
All of the other sessions have one speaker and one commentator
who will speak for about five minutes, so the idea is to save as
much time as possible for the general discussion. I am thrilled to
be a part of this continuing conversation and I think we should
really begin the first panel with Philip Marsden as Chair and he
can introduce the topic and the speakers. Let the marathon begin.
Philip Marsden
Thank you, Spencer, alright so the race is on. We’re going
to pace ourselves quite calmly at the start, you don’t want to burn
out, you don’t want to have your brain fill up with lactic acid, but
nevertheless there are certain ground rules we have to really get
out and understand when you’re talking about the incentives behind getting companies to comply. We’ll be hearing throughout the
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day that they have their own incentives, of course, to obey the law
and to be law-abiding companies and that’s very natural, but
there’s things that competition authorities can do to help induce
that kind of compliance culture, which we will be discussing
throughout the day. And it is very important that competition authorities understand each other’s different approaches because it
has been quite surprising as the competition laws have grown and
expanded around the world that you do see quite different approaches on how competition authorities induce compliance, reward compliance, perhaps sometimes punish certain forms of compliance if it doesn’t work. So, we’re very honored to have András
and Max here to begin our discussion and you’ve got the papers in
front of you but I know that they are going to have some real-life
topics to discuss and please, as Spencer has indicated, remember
that this is a dialogue, it’s not really a lecture so after the initial
speeches we’ll be taking opportunities for you all to have the opportunity to speak, thank you so much.
Dr. András Tóth5
Thank you, thank you Philip. Talking about the relationship between the competition agencies and the competition compliance is so challenging, like running 100 meters within 10 seconds, but I will try to stick to my ten minutes. I would like to show
you from an authority’s perspective why and how a competition
authority can reward a company’s competition compliance efforts.
By compliance I am referring to the company’s compliance program. Two weeks ago, we closed our public consultation on our
new draft of antitrust defining guidelines, which for the first time
in Hungary are taking into account compliance efforts. The first
question that needs to be answered is, “why should a competition
authority encourage and recognize companies’ competition compliance efforts?” The following reasons can be given: firstly, the
companies are best positioned to prevent or detect infringements

5

András Tóth PhD, Chairman of the Hungarian Competition Council; Vice-President of the Hungarian Competition Authority; Associate
Professor, Károli University, Budapest, Hungary.
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and technological developments have further enhanced companies’ internal detection capabilities. For example, company’s big
data analyzes software and can enable a real-time compliance effort to be undertaken. Secondly, it may help to reveal and put an
end to conduct at an early stage. Thirdly, the provision of the rewards may accolade the competition between potential leniency
applicants. Finally, it may anchorage more leniency applications.
The second question concerns the manner in which competition
authorities should recognize the compliance efforts of companies,
I would like to raise six issues here. The first, we have to differentiate between ex ante and ex post compliance. Ex ante recognition
of competition compliance refers to a situation in which a competition compliance program has already been implemented prior to
the finding of the competition infringement. Ex post recognition of
competition compliance means when a compliance program is either adopted or operated during the competition proceeding. Second, based on the international best practices, the mere adoption
of compliance programs cannot in itself lead to immunity or total
reduction of fines, otherwise competition compliance would become a cheap insurance policy against the competition liability.
Based on international experiences, only genuine compliance efforts can be recognized, which means that the company must be
able to demonstrate how its competition compliance regime is altered in detection and determination of the infringement and the
discovery of new or evidence in the case in question. In such a case,
authorities may further reduce a fine by an extra five to ten percent. So, an automatic ex post recognition of compliance may undermine the adoption of ex ante compliance programs which could
prevent or detect illegal activities before an actual infringement is
committed. However, ex post recognition of compliance can be
used to improve the attractiveness of cooperative and administrative burden-saving procedures such as settlement or non-full immunity leniency. The fine can be reduced in this case by a few, up
to a maximum of five percent, in case of a company that adopts or
upgrades an existing compliance program to ensure effective competition compliance for the future in settlement or leniency application for a fine reduction or if the company has compensated the
damages caused by the infringement during the procedure. Fourth,
the recognition of compliance may raise the question as to whether
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this recognition can only be positive. I am confident that if a company deliberately breaches the compliance program that it adopted
in the previous competition procedure then this can be regarded as
an aggravating circumstance. The question is, what can be regarded as a deliberate breach or what should the competition authority do when it learns that an ex ante compliance program has
been used to hide an infringement? For example, if a competition
authority obtains evidence that a compliance program has been effective and the responsible officers of the company have been informed of the wrongdoing but they have chosen to neither stop the
infringement nor report it to the competition authority, should we
require the company to report the wrongdoing identified as a result
of the effective operation of the compliance program? Or, is it
enough that the company puts an end to the infringement based
upon the compliance effort? Fifth, the informant reward also raises
important questions, if the competition agency has such kind of
system. Based on our experiences, we have informant reversed systems in Hungary, informants usually do not provide high-quality
first-hand evidence and therefore, a very limited number of informant applications, in our case ten percent of the total applications, are capable of initiation of competition procedure and so it’s
very limited. So therefore, it can be very desirable if the potential
informant is subject to a company’s compliance program to first
report his or her finding to the company’s compliance officers. Of
course, this is heavily dependent on whether the informant believes
that he or she will not suffer adverse consequences of reporting the
behavior. It is usually the case that the company has sufficient resources to collect and submit evidence according to the competition authority’s needs. However, the company may attempt to hide
the infringement as reported by the informant. The question is,
shall we take into account this factor and shall we maintain the
competition between the informants and the companies? Finally,
compliance as a mitigating factor would discriminate against those
small and medium sized enterprises who don’t have sufficient resources to develop compliance programs. When taking into account ex post and ex ante compliance programs, my question is
how can we ensure that small and medium sized enterprises are
not discriminated against?
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Philip Marsden
Thank you very much. An excellent start to lay out some of
these important issues for the companies and obviously for the staff
of the companies and also of the authorities and how to best juggle
these various incentives. I know already that we’ve got some differences of opinion in the room, which will be really nice to bring
out after Professor Huffman has had a chance to lay out his views
on the same topic relating to the incentives related to compliance,
and also this idea of what is genuine compliance. I remember one
time talking to a group of company officials, sales directors at a
company, and them saying, “yes don’t worry we’ve all been
through the sheep dipping,” meaning you take the sheep and put
them into some sort of soap and now they’ve had their compliance
program. And you could just tell by the way they described it that
this was not a genuine feeling that they understood the law, but the
company had a compliance program, but it wasn’t the kind of active program that the authorities like and I know that some of the
companies in the room right now have really quite active and involved compliance programs and that’s what we’re trying to understand: what works? Something that’s not just cosmetic, that’s
not just some sort of, how you say, cheap insurance, you don’t
want that, so Max over to you please.
Max Huffman
I’ll try to add some comments that are actually valuable additions to the comments from Dr. Tóth. It seems to me that there
are three things that come up when I think about the issue of compliance. The first one: It always confounds me that this is such a
problem. We have this phenomenon where there are laws passed
and we expect people to comply with the law and yet there is a
huge literature, both academic and professional, on what it means
to comply and how you accomplish compliance. I’m intrigued by
that necessity. I also want, second, to speak to the question of the
allocation of responsibility among the various players in the process. Dr. Tóth, I think, spoke very accurately and ably about the
role of the regulated entities, but to me there were other players as
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well that should be considered when we think about who is responsible for compliance. And finally, I think maybe from all that, I can
offer some suggestion for what I think bringing these together
might reflect achievement of compliance, something where we can
actually say that’s an outcome that would accomplish the goals.
Starting with the first: The idea of why compliance is a
problem, in particular in the area of competition policy. There’s
one reality that is generic across all entity decision making, and it’s
the problem that the costs of decisions may not be borne by the
decision maker and may not be borne by the beneficiaries of a particular decision. And where that’s the case, you would tend to see
somebody making a decision but shifting a cost elsewhere. I include in the discussion paper a couple of anecdotal examples of this
that have sort of come up in trade press or otherwise. I’m actually
curious, when the conversation continues after I relinquish the microphone, I’m curious what people’s experiences are, if that’s actually accurate, if it’s true that you see entity decision making in
which the individual that is making and benefiting from a decision
is not then bearing the cost of any violation that has been caused.
But to the extent that’s so, compliance to me really is a corporate
governance question more than it is a law enforcement question.
It’s really a question of how do we shift the responsibility to the
right place? It’s not a meaningful disincentive to have law enforcement if the person who is actually responsible for the decision and
the person who actually benefits from the decision, whether it be
the high-level decision maker or whether it be the marketing executive who was otherwise insulated, if that person doesn’t get
caught, then all this discussion is, I think, all for naught.
It seems to me, and I’m now going to revert a little bit to
U.S. experience, we’ve dealt with this fairly well, or at least we’ve
dealt with this very visibly, in the securities-law context. There,
we’ve shifted responsibility to high-level decision-makers to actually reflect their approval of particular publications, disseminations of information in a way that helps to ensure at least in securities law, that the CEO is on the hook and then you can hope for
a trickle-down effect from that. I don’t think we do it as well in
competition law and I think the reason for that is that competition
issues arise sort of on a recurring basis, it’s a business tort like any
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other, which is to say, the cartel is not formed with the yearly statement that gets filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the cartel is formed—as Spencer Waller ably points out in his discussion paper that we’ll talk about this afternoon—somewhere in
the bathroom or on the golf course or otherwise, and it’s a lot
harder to sort of put someone on the hook for that if that person is
not signing off and saying, “yes I approve of this cartel.” So, you
have the difficulty of actually tying the harm to the person actually
engaged in the process.
If the first question is why is compliance something that we
see as being a problem, I move on to the next question of what is it
about the nature of competition law that makes the field likely to
present compliance issues? And there’s some discussion, I think
Dr. Tóth points this out, but we have other discussion papers that
also raise this, it’s the commonly asserted issue with antitrust specifically, which is the ambiguous nature of the prohibitions. There
are very few bright line rules in this field. The places where you do
see bright line rules that are fairly easy to counsel on and advise
clients on, I actually think that this is one place where the U.S. does
a fairly good job because we’ve got the criminal law scheme and
other jurisdictions that have a criminal law scheme, it’s fairly easy
to say, “that’s criminal conduct,” and avoid that at all costs. Before
I’m too adulatory of the criminal law scheme, even that is a matter
of degree: there’s still an eye of the beholder phenomenon in deciding whether something will be treated criminally or otherwise, but
at least there you have a fairly binary principal—don’t do the thing
that is criminal. If you don’t have a criminal law scheme, you’re
left with gradations of enforcement emphasis that I think are, at
their worst, very fuzzy but even at their best, I think are defined
well by sophisticated practitioners and not well-understood by
business-people, and I think it’s a necessary result of the phenomenon like rules of reason and otherwise. So, when you have malleable rules for conduct it becomes tremendously important to say to
somebody, “here’s what you must do, here’s what you must not
do,” and for that reason, added to the fact that we have individuals
making decisions who are not necessarily bearing the cost, you are
likely to have compliance problems.
And the last one that I’ll flag, which I think is sort of a problem we have in the competition scheme, is that the remedies end
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up being not necessarily correlated with the harms that we’re seeking to prevent. It’s one thing if you have a criminal/civil breakdown and so you can identify, okay, criminal remedies over here
for certain really bad conduct and civil remedies over here, but we
haven’t considered the possibility of, for example, add in to that
private damages remedies and in the U.S. there is a fair amount of
discussion in literature about the problems of private damages
remedies and how private damages can increase the difficulty of
deciding what is something a firm should avoid. If the agency is
saying this thing over here but the private plaintiff has the opportunity to bring a lawsuit that challenges that conduct, you’ve undermined some of these, sort of, binary distinctions between good
and bad conduct.
All of these are sort of wrapped into the problem of why
competition law ends up with compliance issues at a level that
maybe we don’t see in some other areas of the law or that we’ve
dealt with more effectively in other areas of the law. The last thing
to cover here that I think is important as a discussion topic is that
of who is responsible for trying to manage these compliance issues?
From my perspective, there are probably three different parties
you could pin this on. The first would be, I think, the public enforcers, and say that for compliance, because public enforcers are
in charge of ensuring that the markets operate freely and operate
without restraint, they should have the role of trying to facilitate
and encourage the compliance process. The second choice to me
would be the entity, of course the regulated entity, and that makes
a lot of sense and most of the compliance literature seems to put
the onus on the regulated firm. But the third would be the individual who’s actually making the decision, this might be a person you
could put this on.
To start with the public enforcer, to the extent that we think
that is the important place to put compliance obligations, I think
we have a fairly effective dissemination of information that should
facilitate compliance. We have, at least in the most sophisticated
of the antitrust regimes that we have on the globe, you tend to see
education programs that I think are very difficult to improve on.
So much so that you could teach an antitrust course just on the
basis of the materials that are housed on the websites of the antitrust enforcement agencies, and so too for a lawyer’s informing his
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or her client as to the kind of conduct that will be challenged. So, I
think that’s pretty impressive. And you add to that things like enforcement guidelines, which inform the ways in which agencies interpret the ambiguous rules and you also add to that questions like
business review procedures, which do a good job in sort of narrowing the ways in which we think about these ambiguous rules, and
it mitigates a lot of these problems about ambiguity that we’ve
been talking about. From that perspective, I think the enforcers
get a lot of credit for what they’ve done in order to advance the
goal of compliance. But it doesn’t fully answer the question of if
the responsibility is mostly on the enforcers and you see a problem,
should we see that as being a law enforcement, should we see it as
being a criminal violation problem, or should we see that as a failing in the process of informing the public about what it is we find
problematic; and where that responsibility ultimately lies I think
speaks to some of how you end up treating the notion of compliance.
The second question is that of the private firm’s taking the
role, and most of the literature referenced in Dr. Tóth’s thoughtful
remarks point to the role of the private firm in compliance programs. When I think about that, I’m not sure what a private compliance program fully accomplishes. You are left with these problems of cosmetic compliance issues, the concern that someone uses
compliance in order to communicate to the world—whether it is
internally or externally—that the firm’s agents are good people doing a good job abiding by legal rules. But whether these programs
actually do a good job of stopping problems, I think is less than
100% clear. If we have a relatively sophisticated understanding of
what compliance is and what programs are, and we are still not
preventing enforcement issues arising that suggests to me that
maybe the private firm is not the place to put the obligation for
compliance. To say nothing of what we’ve started with, which is
the idea that individual decision makers are ultimately the ones
who are driving the law violations.
Where that’s so, then maybe we’re back to the question of
whether the onus for compliance should be put most squarely on
the individual, somehow ensuring we have found the correct individual. I’ll finish up there with the idea that when I think about
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what makes sense for compliance I come back to, what I’ve attributed to Spencer Waller but also others, that the idea that ultimately, it’s a question of finding a way to shift responsibility to the
person making and benefiting from the decision within the entity
and so any kind of a compliance regime that accomplishes that, to
me, overrides any other possible understanding of what would be
appropriate compliance. I think all of the problems of cosmetic
compliance and otherwise are mitigated if the compliance program
that the entity adopts is one that finds a way to see that the person
who actually engages in the conduct suffers the harm, whether it
be jail or a fine or otherwise, at the end of the day.
In sum, we circled through why it is that compliance in
competition law is a problem, some of it being ambiguity, some of
it being individuals, some of it being agency-cost issues that are
discussed in the academic literature, and then we’ve talked about
in some depth about how it is we might allocate responsibility for
trying to achieve these things on the basis of who seems to be the
most affective locus of the responsibility.
Philip Marsden
Thank you very much Max. So, both speakers have taken
us through the five-kilometer mark, and we are warmed up a little
bit and we don’t reach out second wind until after caffeine. But, to
get us to that point, I’d like you to start indicating that you’d like
to participate in the dialogue and when you do to use your microphone and please, for purposes of our publication, to identify yourself and your affiliation before your remarks. So, while you are preparing to raise your nametag, I just want to do a brief reflection. It
is so important in this compliance area, which seems so broad, to
try to think about this question that Max has asked which is, “why
is this so difficult?” Anti-money laundering compliance, securities
compliance isn’t; so is it because there’s something, some issue,
which I know we will speak about later about the ambiguous nature of competition law or is it to do with the culture? I’ve had a
case recently in the U.K., where, it’s a cartel case, and they knew
full well that what they were doing was wrong, they knew full well
that it was a criminal act. They didn’t particularly know anything
about competition law, but they felt the moral wrongness. Their
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conclusion was, “we therefore have to hide what we’re doing,” obviously rather than, “we shouldn’t do it.” You know, whether you
do a cost-benefit analysis, which they didn’t do, about the profits
they would gain by cartelizing. They just felt we need to order this
market, we need to stop killing ourselves, stop hurting ourselves
through vicious competition, we need to be more sensible. Yes, it’s
illegal and it feels wrong, but we have to hide it, not, we shouldn’t
do it. So, this may be an obvious statement, but it has puzzled me
as well about why we have to, as authorities, devote so many resources to compliance and getting the message out when it seems a
pretty easy message, but that’s just with respect to price fixing,
which is relatively binary and in some countries criminal. But
when you get into the area of hub and spoke cartels or vertical restraints areas or what is a dominant position, and what is the specialty responsibility of a dominant company, it becomes very, very
difficult. So, let’s begin the dialogue. Some of the people in this
room have advised these companies, they’ve seen a range of conduct where they think, “gosh, I’m going to have to now take this
company through several years of litigation and investigation because of what they did wrong. Why didn’t we catch this early?”
Thank you, Mark.
Mark Clough6
It’s only because I’m bold and nobody else seems to want
to take up the challenge. I was going to raise two questions. One is,
I think Max just referred to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the obligation to file there. We also have in the U.K. the
U.K. Financial Conduct Authority and in answer to the president’s
question about who should be responsible for competition compliance, I wonder whether, in fact, it shouldn’t be the legislator that
puts the burden on the competition authority? And I wonder how
it works in the U.S. so well, or so it appears from constant newspaper reports and cartels being filed in the Securities Exchange and
whether it is working in the U.K. I just raise that as the first question.

6

Dentons Europe LLP
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The second question is how this all fits in with leniency because the two papers constantly refer to that. I think that’s very
important and I think that we live in a harsh world if I can put it
like that. In my experience with dealing with certain commercial
operators, and I will not mince my words by using the word
“banks,” I’ve been amazed by the reaction sometimes to the competition law advice given to banks and being told to basically go
and lose myself. And I think one has to bear in mind that there are
certain members of corporate society that consider themselves to
be above the law, and I wonder what we do about that in terms of
making an incentive out of leniency for that sort of business mentality.
Philip Marsden
Thank you, Mark. Never, never provocative Mark Clough.
Fantastic. Gábor…
Gábor Fejes7
Thank you very much. My name is Gábor Fejes, I’m a private practitioner and partner at Oppenheim, a law firm in Hungary. I was going to make just one comment on Professor Huffman’s point. I think one of the reasons why it’s relatively difficult
to say who benefits of a wrongdoing is that board members, when
they are caught for cartels, can say, and I have heard them saying
to shareholders, “whilst we have been doing the cartel, you have
been benefiting from it, too.” So, the extra-profits are in the dividends actually. And I think that leads to the point of non-cosmetic
compliance programs. I think it’s right that responsibility should
be shifted to the decision makers and that’s what a compliance
program should finally be about. Finally, a compliance program is
an internal law. It’s just actually implementing the law within a
community; an institution, a company is a community of people
governed by a set of external, but also self-made, internal rules.
And this company will have assets. However, assets cannot have
responsibilities, it is people that have responsibilities within that
7
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company. And a non-cosmetic or a genuine compliance program
will, I think, have this main feature, and that also comes up in this
bible which is exhibited here, namely the ICC Compliance Program Guide. The decision makers should know what the law is
and bear the consequences. So, in this internal root, a compliance
program is nothing else but an implementation (in the European
Union we all have an idea of what implementation means) of a
higher-ranking norm in this “community” and if it’s implemented
right then those decision makers bear certain responsibilities. So, if
I were a competition authority, I would look at a compliance program and see, whether, in addition to the sheep washing, there is a
rule that says that the affected board members or the affected managers will have their own responsibility, in whatever form, but obviously a financial responsibility will be the bottom line. Thank
you.
Spencer Waller
Well, along those lines I just want to share two very short
stories about the difference between that internal company or community ethic where people get it and perhaps, where they don’t,
which is a common experience that many of us have had as advisors or enforcers. One is, a family friend, this is years ago. He was
a mid-level businessman at Mobil before it merged with Exxon, so
this is a number of years ago and this gentleman has passed away.
When he learned that I was teaching antitrust law he began to talk
to me and he said, “we all are gun shy because do you remember
the Socony-Vacuum8 case?” I said, “well of course.” And he says,
“when I joined the company they simply told me, they sat me down
and said ‘if you run into someone in the waiting room that works
for a competitor, here are the things you can talk about: you can
talk about the weather, you can talk about sports, you can talk
about your families, and the rest you shouldn’t talk about.’” And
it relates to the famous Socony-Vacuum case, which in part, helped
establish the per se rule against price-fixing in the United States.
And so, even in the late-80s early 90s, even though this was now

8

United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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almost fifty years after the case itself, somehow, at least in his part
of the company, this was an established ethic.
In contrast, I don’t remember the gentleman’s name, but
there is a published interview in the Antitrust Bulletin, a number
of years ago, with the gentleman who went to jail in the Marine
Hose cartel. And if you read this interview, and I can send anyone
a link to this article, it’s fascinating. He says, well, he’s serving
time in prison, “I understand it’s illegal,” I’m paraphrasing, he
says, “I’m still not sure why it was wrong.” He said, “of course I
had to admit what I did in court, I did those things. But I’m still
not 100% sure why me.” So, I thought it was a nice contrast.
Philip Marsden
That’s really nice. And the example I was giving before
about where people knew it was wrong, they knew it was illegal in
some way, they didn’t know anything about competition law. But
they realized, we shouldn’t be doing this. And then there’s that
contrasting position where people think there’s some regulation
out there, we’ve crossed some sort of boundary, but I don’t understand why that’s wrong but I have to put my hand up to it. It’s
amazing. Ted…
Edward Janger9
Ted Janger, Brooklyn Law School. I am, by in large, not of
the world of antitrust. However, I’ve been listening closely, and
see that there’s a common thread between this discussion and ongoing discussions in other areas that I also know relatively little
about . . . I’m a bankruptcy guy, so I’ve had to get used to the idea
of bank resolution. And I’m a bankruptcy guy so I’ve had to learn
about securities regulation and in both of those areas, right now,
compliance is at the forefront. But, in each field, the underlying
norm is different. In bank resolution the concern is, systemically
important financial institutions (SIFIs) should not fail, and if they
do fail, the failure should not lead to the collapse of the global financial system. In securities regulation, by contrast, one is, by and
9
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large, concerned with fraud, and in antitrust we have the norm of
don’t conspire with your competitors. However, what you see, in
all of those discussions, is a somewhat generic set of moves.
In other words, compliance is corporate governance writ
large (and small). While, on the other hand, we’ve moved away
from concern about the underlying norm to sort ask, how do you
govern a firm? We are also stuck in our own little silos talking
about how do we govern within the firm to enforce a specific legal
norm?
I think Max’s paper really brought it out quite nicely. First,
“what’s the underlying norm?” This question may be fuzzy, when
asked in the abstract, but as Max pointed out, it can be made concrete once contextualized by asking, “what’s the underlying behavior that people should just know is wrong?” Second, within the
firm, how do we make sure that each of the actors has skin in the
game of norm enforcement? It is possible to construct compensation and enforcement structures that work on different levels with
different people. For banks, for example, capital rule influences the
top-level decision makers. By contrast, structural subordination
and hierarchies of compensation may influence investors. While,
at the individual level, the task may be making sure that managerial compensation structure ensures that you pay for something
you did a long time ago? Finally, there’s the role of the regulatory
supervisor, which is to ask, “Can we look at what a firm is doing
and say, ‘They are getting it right?’” So, in bank resolution, you
have the living will process, where the FDIC says, “we’re going to
look at how your plan and we’re either going to sign off on it or
not? We’re not telling you how to do it, but we are asking you to
show us that you are you doing it.”
These are the levels of analysis that I think we are going to
be dealing with throughout the day. But Mark put his finger on
something: Within an industry, we need to shift the norm from,
“this is not our job - our job is to make money for our shareholders”
to “it’s our job to be a company that is a good corporate citizen.”
Which by the way, is what Brandeis said 100 years ago, “business
is a profession cloaked with a public interest.” That seems to me to
be a role that the regulators can inculcate but there’s a lot of walking to do before that.
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Philip Marsden
But also, let’s do it the right way. Vincent…
Dr. Vincent Power10
Philip, I’ll have to say, with all of your great analogies
about the marathon, I have hit the wall at this stage [laughter].
Thank you for such thought-provoking and different perspectives. I would like to make just a few observations on those
perspectives.
First, to Max’s point about securities law, I believe that
“time” is a very important factor in this context. If you look at the
securities arena, many of the issues come to light because of announcements which are often made quarterly (e.g., results being
published each quarter) or filings which are made in the aftermath
of a share transfer but, by contrast, competition or antitrust issues
are usually not so quick or transparent. If you contrast the securities sector with, say, the recent Intel case where the Court of Justice
of the European Union referred the matter back to another court,
the EU’s General Court, this is a matter where the complaint was
started in 2001. Put the EU’s Intel case in human terms, if that was
a baby born in 2001 when the complaint was lodged then it is about
to leave high school now and the case is not concluded. Equally, if
you look at cases where there may have been cartels which may
have been hidden for, say 14 years as in one recent case, you are
looking again at the “time” factor. So, it would be very useful to be
able to take some of what has been done in the securities’ side and
bring it across into the antitrust/competition arena but it’s not always that easy. I believe that the speed at which securities issues
are dealt with is a very good case study and I think it should serve
as a magnetic north for the competition arena that we should aim
for, but it will be more difficult in the antitrust arena.
András’ point was, I thought again, very interesting about
should companies and other undertakings be obliged to report?
And if you think about how the aviation sector deals with nearmisses then there is a useful analogy. In the context of aviation
10
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near-misses, reporting is not seen as a criticism or condemnation
but rather as a necessary step in preventing future issues. And I
was doing a case recently in the context of driverless cars and it
was very interesting because one of the people involved mentioned,
“if I drive home tonight and narrowly miss a cyclist, I’ve learned
something for the rest of my life, but no other motorist has done so.
With driverless cars, there’s a software download five minutes
later to every car in the Universe.” So, there is some value in reporting. There is also another angle worth exploring in this context,
namely, the element of compliance assistance undertaken by advisors. Specifically, this is what law firms or economists do when
they send their clients information about new investigations, cases
and trends, this is a form of indirect reporting.
I believe just on the responsibility point, that “sheep dipping” certainly works but only to a point. It’s when “sheep shearing” happens that it really works (i.e., there is an investigation,
prosecution, conviction, punishment etc.). You do need individual
responsibility to make competition law work otherwise it is just a
tax on the company. The problem there is, again, the gap of time.
If people are paid bonuses on an immediate basis, but a breach is
uncovered much later then the impact may be lost so there is great
value in having “delayed rewards” until something has really been
cleared through the system and proof that there is no breach or
issue.
Max just raised a point and I thought it was very, very interesting again, about the criminal sanctions. The great thing
about criminal sanctions is that they really concentrate the mind
of executives. But it also means that, in all probability, many
judges (and, possibly, jurors) find it more difficult to decide that
there has been a breach of the law because sometimes people may
have done something wrong but they were unaware of the illegality and courts can be reluctant to criminalize someone in such circumstances – the courts would have had less difficulty in finding
that there was a civil breach but a criminal breach might be going
too far. General non-specialist competition law judges who have
not had the benefit of doing six competition law marathons may
not actually grasp the fact that breaches of competition law can be
criminal etc. And therefore, you are sometimes better off with a
civil standard so as to get some notches on the “competition law
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belt” and then you move it to criminality when there is widespread
understanding that this is criminal in some situations. While Canada had competition law in 1889, the U.S. in 1890, and so on, many
competition laws around the world are mere teenagers. And it is
not always clear to business people that they are doing something
illegal – indeed, if lawyers and economists can find this area difficult to grasp at times, one must have sympathy and empathy for
lay business people.
The last point to mention is enlisting advisors in the enforcement process. Now, it’s a difficult space because of privilege
and confidentiality and so on, but at what point does an advisor
have a responsibility to say this is actually something which is
wrong, step back or indeed report it to the authorities? It is an issue
worth reflecting on carefully.
Philip Marsden
A company went to a law firm for some advice with regards
to whether its prospective conduct was legal or not and the law
firm advised it was legal, so the company is raising this as a defense
right now. In the investigation, they admitted that they asked the
law firm the wrong question, they didn’t give all the information
to the law firm and now the law firm is quite interested in and is
being named in some of these proceedings. So, advisors are definitely important, but they have to be given the honest picture. But
of course, Vincent may have hit the wall with respect to running
puns, but you have to run through the wall in a marathon or else
you won’t get to the finish line. And if he brings up the subject of
time, time is relatively important in running a marathon, at least
that you have a good time while doing it. But in respect to his nearmisses point, this is why in a marathon we close the roads because
we don’t want to be hit by cars when we are running across the
river in Budapest. And I can go all day, and all night with running
puns [laughter]. Now, moving back to Tihamér.
Tihamér Tóth11
11

Habil. Assistant Professor at Pázmány Péter Catholic University,
Competition Law Research Center; Attorney, Réczicza Dentons Europe

8.First Panel.docx (Do Not Delete)

Loyola Consumer Law Review

142

5/4/18 7:16 PM

Vol. 30:2

Thank you, Philip. Just a short note, you posed that very
important question, “what makes competition law special? Why do
we need special incentives here versus labor law or securities law?”
I think it may have to do with human nature. I do not pretend to
be a human anthropologist but that has been my impression and
experience that many people would prefer to cooperate than to
fight with each other. We prefer to socialize, to chat together, to
meet together. Just like this event which is the result of a co-operation between three great institutions. We did not create our own,
competing events. So that might be, I think, an underlying problem
with which we have to deal with and an efficient compliance program would have to deal with.
Philip Marsden
And it’s an interesting point too because in many of these
industries we are dealing with people and people swap jobs. While
they know each other as a negotiating counterpart, or they may
know each other as former colleagues. And they might say to each
other, “what are you doing? Why can’t we have this market and
you have that market?” They may not even cross a line just because they are trying to be amenable, friends. And they butt up
against legal standards which favor independence and ignorance
about what the competitor is doing, and these can be inconsistent.
Zoltán Hegymegi-Barakonyi12
My name is Zoltán Hegymegi-Barakonyi, I’m a partner at
Baker McKenzie and also represent the Hungarian Competition
Association here. I’d like to refer to the title of this panel, this session, “Incentives to Complying.” Of course, there are lots of incentives for companies to comply, which we are always teaching at the
trainings and educational programs for companies. But, I’d like to
take the opportunity that we have a group of law enforcers and
there was this excellent introduction by András. I don’t think that
LLP.
12
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compliance should come from the authority or the regulator. There
is the law and there is self-regulation. But an authority cannot be
totally neutral to compliance programs. I think it’s a great responsibility of an enforcer and an authority what it does with or about
compliance. It can do something which will encourage compliance
but if it doesn’t do it the right way, it will discourage compliance.
And that’s where we come to the bullet points of András: what a
good policy a regulator would be towards compliance programs?
It should be a genuine compliance program with regards to how it
operates, etc. But, I think that you have to be reasonable, if a law
enforcer expects too much from a compliance program, it might
backfire because the business would realize, “I might not be able
to meet that standard.” Whether it is expected that the compliance
program will reveal all the wrongdoings in a company of 10,000
employees, whether compliance should end the violation or report
it to the authorities by submitting a leniency application where it
is possible that for those infringements there won’t be leniency
available. First, I think the regulator should ask the question “what
do I want from a business’s specific compliance culture or program?” I would like to hear from law enforcers present here, what
is in their mind in this regard? What do they expect from our clients and businesses? There is a compliance culture already present
in Europe, but I know there is a lot more that companies and regulators can do for improving as the United States has done it. Here
in the European antitrust arena, there are national movements, but
I think we should come to some sort of common EU policy on this
point as well. Thank you.
Philip Marsden
Thank you and while others are reflecting on your question
that you put to the enforcers, I’ll move away from our running
analogy, to a cycling analogy [laughter]. If I was a competition law
enforcer and you think of that as perhaps being someone responsible for anti-doping laws, I would be saying to the cyclists, “you
want to have a fair competition, don’t you?” “You don’t want any
cheats in your industry because it stains the whole industry.” If a
sector becomes known for violations, and then it becomes hinted
that the sector is corrupt, it stains the whole industry. Further, it
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can stain people’s views of possible business in general. And so, I
would say that yes competition authorities have a responsibility,
and the main responsibility I would put on us is to have targeted
compliance efforts and targeted punishment efforts so they are
very much focused on the individuals so we can say, “we’re going
to go after the bad apples, we might have to fine you as well but
we will be very targeted.” Then we will have to describe to the
companies, “don’t you understand, this is hurting the whole industry.” Let’s hear from Poland and what is going on there.
Maciej Bernatt13
Hello, my name is Maciej Bernatt from the University of
Warsaw. When preparing for this great event, I was thinking
about Poland and what is the incentive for compliance programs
working in Poland. I talked to a couple of private lawyers and I
think there is a link between detection and how compliance programs are popular. They told me that you can see effective compliance programs in the industries that were under scrutiny of competition authorities. Once the fear of detection increases, you can
then expect some compliance programs to be present. There is also
a link with leniency programs. They are effective only once competition authorities are capable of detecting cartels. In Poland, for
example, detection has improved slightly but I would say the detection of cartels is still a weak side of competition law enforcement
in Poland. Similarly, compliance programs might not be working
effectively because there is no fear of detection.

Amedeo Arena14

13
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Good morning. My name is Amedeo Arena and I teach
competition law at University of Naples “Federico II.” I really enjoyed the section entitled “Achieving Negative Expected Value,”
in Max’s paper. I think it provides a reliable model to predict the
conduct of corporate decision-makers. According to a my own very
simplified model, the expected value of an antitrust infringement
(𝔼[I]) is equal to the revenue of the infringement (R) multiplied by
the probability of not getting caught (P1) minus the sanctions and
other negative consequences of getting caught (S), multiplied by
the probability of getting caught (P2). So: “𝔼[I] = R · P1 – S · P2.”
Now, this P2, the second probability variable, is essentially a matter of perception. I wonder how compliance programs may affect
this variable. From my experience, the P2 curve has an “invertedU” shape. At the beginning of the session, you hear remarks such
as, “Oh, is that really prohibited?” “Can they really fine us up to
10% of our turnover?” By and large, the value of P2 is grossly underestimated in business circles, therefore antitrust compliance
programs are really encouraging at the beginning as they quickly
lead to the upper part of the “inverted-U,” where firms become
aware of the risks and they try to minimize their exposure by promoting antitrust compliance. The problem is that towards the end
of these antitrust compliance sessions commercial executives get
cocky and say, “True, but maybe we can hide this from the antitrust authorities.” So, I am afraid that the incentives provided for
antitrust compliance programs cannot be targeted in a way that
maximizes the value of P2. Rather, I’m afraid that providing incentives may only reduce the value of the “sanctions and other negative consequences” factor, thus ultimately decreasing the deterrence of antitrust sanctions. Thank you.

Max Huffman
A couple of comments that I thought were pointing to something that I had been thinking about but didn’t include in the discussion draft. I am thinking particularly about a comment you two
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made, Gábor and Vincent, about the idea of implementation of
higher norms and the internal law aspect of a compliance program.
But also, the concept of the near-miss and it speaks to me to this
distinction between viewing competition enforcement as a law enforcement project, which sort of is, historically, the way we have
done it in the U.S. for the most part. In viewing competition enforcement as a regulatory endeavor, which is really sort of a collaboration between the entities, the enforcement agencies which
are charged with ensuring the markets operate and the private enterprises that are operating. If you see it as being law enforcement,
then you are really left with compliance, you are left with this question of the goal of compliance is to avoid the negative expected
value problem. If you see it as a collaborative endeavor working
between the government and the private enterprise in order to, together, achieve efficiency in this particular industry, then you are
more likely to have much more sophisticated interaction on the
question of the compliance program instead of saying, “you better
get it right or else we will hit you with big sanctions.” I’m left with
this question, I don’t know of any agency that says, “we will review
and comment on or give a business review letter on your compliance program.” I think that would be the extreme of this, would be
the idea that if we think someone should implement the law at the
corporate level, then why not ask for review of that and get the
agency to say, “yes, if you implement this compliance program you
will have these benefits from that.” I suppose the easy answer to
that is this is the classic problem of cosmetic compliance, we just
implement what we have in the tool-kit and then presumably stand
to never be sanctioned. So, you’d have to find some way around
that problem.

Spencer Waller
So, I want to just bring up a topic that is, in some ways, a
bridge between what we are talking about and what the next session will focus on. This conversation got me thinking about that
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there are industries in the United States and I’m sure in some extent in other jurisdictions that are on their third and fourth generation of antitrust litigation. I mean generations in the sense of 15
or 20 years of any executive’s likely lifespan as a senior decisionmaker—at least in the United States. there are firms in the roadbuilding industry where the children of the original owners are also
being indicted in the footsteps of their fathers. It’s not a good situation for anybody. But, industries such as concrete, construction,
road building, there are others, and then I was thinking about, as
my example to see if we could have more discussion, the cardboard
box corrugated paper industries that are on their third or fourth
generation of antitrust problems. By and large, they have gone in
the United States from being criminally indicted for overt pricefixing conspiracies, to civil litigation without governmental action
for information exchange and price signaling that generally hasn’t
attracted governmental challenge but has attracted class actions. I
was thinking about this because a very well-regarded class action
lawyer in the United States told me that he is essentially suing the
same companies for the third time on different theories. If it is really 50 or 60 years later and they are not going to jail but are still
litigating these things, often with the same lawyers on both sides,
is that a sign of progress or a sign of despair?
Vincent Power
I have to say that I agree with Spencer. However, I am going to be deliberately provocative to promote discussion. There
are certain sectors where the product isn’t labeled, isn’t branded,
rather it’s commoditized and many of the people involved move
from one employer to another but remain in the same trade association etc. These sectors are rich pickings for the agencies but let
me be provocative.
First, say, the local police force has realized that the road
to the airport is a good road to catch people for speeding and an
officer can meet his or her monthly target by spending two days a
month on that road - is that what is happening in the antitrust
space? Put another way, because my predecessor in the competition agency found something in a particular sector then perhaps I
too will find something there and I don't have to go looking too
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far. I meet my target, but I haven't actually investigated non-typical breaches.
Secondly, again being provocative, there are certain sectors and certain concepts which seem to be fashionable among
agencies and advisors internationally. So, let’s say it’s cartels in
the construction sector with the Dutch and the U.K. and then the
other agencies internationally start to look at the construction sector. Or it might be a concept like price-signaling and so on. It’s almost like people go to the ICN with an empty suitcase and they
come back with concepts and sectors and industries and say,
“that’s a place we haven’t thought of, we’ve both gone to the airport road, but there’s another road where people go to their holiday homes and they’re relaxed, and they drive a little faster.”
[Laughter] Now, I’m being deliberately provocative, but agencies
need to explore all sectors and concepts and not just which are
currently fashionable.
Gábor Fejes
Thank you. I just wanted to make a comment on the cycling
example. Actually, some of the athletes have said, “well I had to do
[doping], because everyone else had been doing it.” And, that might
also be an answer or a comment on Tihamér’s point. I think it’s
great that people want to, and it is in our better nature to cooperate
than to brutally compete. But also, a lot of markets are oligopolistic, and people watch each other. And it’s very difficult whenever
a compliance program or an advisor spots a behavior which might
be problematic, but it’s spread across the industry, people at the
companies will say, “look, I couldn’t stop because everybody has
been doing it. If I stop first, we will make losses, while everybody
else will be better off.” So, there is actually a competition in that
sense about who is braver to endure with the practice. Typically,
it won’t be hardcore cartels, but it will be verticals. Typically, exclusivity clauses, say in the beer industry or other industries. It will
be vertical information exchanges, hub and spoke issues.
As a final comment from this perspective, I think authorities will have to be cautious and mindful about this issue when
dealing with compliance programs. I think it is right to expect from
a compliance program to be effective in the sense that it should
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detect a problem and then the companies should do something
about it. I don’t think, generally, we can require companies to selfincriminate themselves immediately when they find out about a
problem. That’s a possibility, but it should not be an obligation,
whereas in leniency there are rewards for it. And I think it’s right
in general to require companies to stop once they’ve found out the
infringement, but there might be circumstances where it simply
isn’t possible to stop in a meaningful manner without losing a lot.
For instance, I refer to the food industry and their main business
partners, the big retail chains. What if I’m a major sausage producer and I find out there is something wrong in my vertical relationships with those retail chains in one country. I’m not sure I
want to report that because I do business with them in a number
of other countries around Europe and I don’t want to have trouble
with all these retail companies in all those countries. Can I then at
least stop from one day to the other? Surely not. So, it will be difficult to advise, and it will be difficult for the companies. I think
what matters is that they should start doing something about it in
a structured manner which leads to a good outcome, but it’s not
easy to stop from one day to the other. Stopping the practice will
require some time in such cases.
Philip Marsden
I quite agree and the point that Tihamér makes, related to
the work by Axelrod years ago about the evolution of cooperation
and tit-for-tat cooperation is a very good point. We’re social animals, you get into an industry with, as I mentioned earlier, people
working for different companies, they change jobs and you come
into a situation where this is just the way it is. And even if you say
to them “it’s no defense to a competition investigation that everybody does it, in fact, thank you very much for telling us that everybody does it, here’s a microphone, go back to the meeting and
ask some more questions.” But, one thing I’ve noticed, and this
again goes to the point about why it is so difficult to induce compliance sometimes. Unless, as we’ll hear later, the good works on
the international level of trying to get the message out everywhere
can help a lot. The two times I’ve seen, not cartels that have fallen
apart, but that are fresh cartels and they suddenly change. One, is
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the acquisition by one company, usually an American buyer. And
through the due diligence process you suddenly see people being
told, “whoa, what you’ve been doing is wrong.” And the other
thing I’ve noticed, which, sadly doesn’t have the same direct effect,
is if we as competition authorities win a case and publicize it and
put posts on our Twitter account about what we’ve found—we’ve
seen this at least in the real estate sector in the U.K.—we see an
estate agent suddenly say, “hang on, we better review because
we’ve sent very similar messages to our competitors as well.” So,
the competition authority publicizing what they think safe isn’t,
“this is not normal, it may be business as usual for you, but it’s not
normal.” Then we’ve seen actual evidence of leniency applicants
coming in and saying, “we’re coming in because we saw your Twitter and we think something is going on and can I please wear a
microphone at the next meeting?” And I wish they were always
that generous but those are just some reflections. Mark…
Mark Clough
Thank you, Philip. Just a quick question about an issue
we’ve raised but haven’t really discussed, and that’s the advisor’s
responsibility. With the benefit of so many different countries here,
I just wondered what the money laundering rules are, maybe starting with the U.S. and the obligations imposed on lawyers who are
told by a client that their client is involved in a cartel? In the U.K.
it is quite complicated because of course the criminal nature of the
cartel offense is addressed at the individual rather than the company level. I thought I’d bring us back to that because it may be
quite important in the future.

Vincent Power
Philip, I just wanted to say that Mark’s question is a very
good one. But just to go back to the issue of “importance,” you’ve
actually hit the nail on the head by giving the examples. It is extremely important that competition agencies give examples. The
reason why it is important is because clients, colleagues, such as
lawyers are going out and giving examples to companies. You
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know, people can talk about Intel with a fine of €1 billion, they can
talk about trucks at €2 billion, they can talk about lifts and €995
million. Many people sit there at compliance sessions and look up
and say, “in my wildest dreams, I could never do anything that
could cause a problem like that for my employer.” On the other
hand, if a national competition agency gives them practical, simple
examples like the infamous email in the Hasbro case, where as you
know, an executive emailed colleagues saying something along the
lines of “you've done a great job in fixing prices but a word to the
wise, delete this” followed by several exclamation marks. People
can see that and identify with those examples. So, competition
agencies will enhance compliance where they give as many examples as possible that most employees could identify with – simple
cases can be just as persuasive as the mega cases. Equally, to enhance compliance, it is a good idea to utilize during compliance
training, photographs of real people who have actually been convicted because participants can find that very persuasive – it
brings the message home loud and clear – these are people like the
employees of this company etc. And if you make it really local and
relevant, then people are more likely to comply. Examples are really important.
Philip Marsden
Yes, keep it real and make it real, and make it hit home.
We’re coming to the end of the first session, the aid station is in
sight. András, some concluding remarks, reflections on some of the
points we’ve discussed?

András Tóth
I’m convinced, based on today’s discussion, that the competition authorities have to be willing to recognize companies’
compliance efforts. Especially because competition law is still a
teenager in our region, where for more than 40 years during communism business leaders were told that they should cooperate with
each other in order to meet centrally devised plans. These leaders
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then, without any transitional period, had to radically change their
mindsets in 1990 and stop cooperating. In this regard, I am sure
that competition authorities have a responsibility to incentivize
companies’ compliance effort.
Philip Marsden
Thank you very much, great point. Let’s have a break now.

